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14 March 1952

Noted by DCI

21 Mar 52 - *ack*

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE.

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans).

SUBJECT: [] Report on CIA Installations
in the Far East.

1. Pursuant to your oral request of 12 March, I have read and return to you herewith [] report to you dated 4 March 1952. As you suggested, I have made a few long-hand marginal notations opposite each of [] points which appear to require comment.

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2. I had previously received an oral briefing from [] and I find that his written report to you varies in only a few significant particulars. The probable reason for this variance is stated in his own introductory paragraph in which he says that in writing his report he is purposely avoiding mention of "the many excellencies noted" in order to stress "those areas of deficiency susceptible of improvement." The result has been a concentration on the difficulties which may to some extent warp the picture.

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3. Notwithstanding the remarks in the last preceding paragraph, we are all aware that our operations in the Far East are far from what we would like to have them, and in some cases stand in need of drastic action to accomplish improvement. At the heart of the problem there are two main features, viz.:

a. Qualified and experienced personnel.

b. Better organization.


4. Concerning the problem of personnel, this is by all means the most difficult. This Agency is still in its extreme youth, and we simply have not had the time to develop the quantity and kind of people we must have if we are to successfully carry out the heavy burdens which have been placed upon us. The procurement, training, and development through experience of personnel is a long and tedious process during the course of which many promising individuals fall by the wayside. Our difficulties in the Far East have been marked and accentuated by this problem of personnel -- the more so because of our

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necessarily rapid expansion in that area.

5. As our next step we contemplate the transfer to the field of a number of the people whom we have developing at headquarters, since by comparison with the field the headquarters establishment is relatively rich in personnel.

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6. With regard to the question of organization, I think there is now general agreement that because of the remoteness of the Far Eastern area and the great distances between points there, it will be necessary to establish two or perhaps three regional sub-commands. The question here is not whether, but where and how. As you will recall, we have been keeping this question open pending the return of Messrs. [redacted] and Kirkpatrick from their trip. We have General Merrill's recommendations and also the suggestions made to us by Admiral Radford, and I believe that I am familiar, at least in a general way, with your views and those of Mr. Dulles. Within two weeks I expect to be able to present you with a plan for a new organizational set-up in the Far East which will include provision for the establishment of at least two regional headquarters.


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Frank G. Wisner

cc: DDCI
ADSO
ADPC

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
4 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Observations of [] during visit to
CIA Installations in the Far East

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[] A discussion with the Director, however, indicated his belief that a statement on my own observations was desirable and it is in response to this suggestion that this report is submitted. It should be noted that in an observation tour such as was made, time available at any one place was so short as to preclude the possibility of comprehensive study of any one type of CIA operation, or the collection of data and the preparation of detailed analyses. Dependence must therefore be placed on impressions received during more or less cursory visits and discussions with CIA field personnel.

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[] It should also be noted that rather than enumerating and describing the many excellencies noted, it will be the effort to point out those areas thought to be susceptible of improvement.

3. During my stay in San Francisco from the night of Sunday 13 January to 0100 Wednesday 16 January I devoted myself almost exclusively to laying the necessary groundwork for sea support of

CIA operations

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CIA operations in the Far East, which will be dealt with in a later paragraph.

4. Hawaii, 16-19 January.

25X1 a. A series of group discussions and conferences was held with the Commander in Chief, Admiral Radford, and the principal members of his staff, as well as more informal discussions with individual key staff members. Admiral Radford attended most of the group discussions and evinced a keen interest throughout. I got the very strong impression that the Admiral and his staff were keenly interested in what CIA was trying to do, and were eager to help in any way possible in furtherance of the CIA mission. The feeling seemed to be that in the past they had had too little information of what CIA was trying to do and no very clear idea of CIA capabilities. These doubts were to a large extent dissipated by the very excellent exposition of CIA plans and existing capabilities given by [redacted] and Mr. Kirkpatrick. Some disappointment was voiced at the very limited CIA capabilities disclosed with the general reaction being "what can we do to improve the situation?" A strong desire for closer collaboration and mutual support was voiced with the hope expressed that by such means CIA could be more intelligently supported with consequent greatly improved direct intelligence service by CIA to the Commander in Chief.

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b. [redacted]

In this concept the senior CIA representative [redacted] is given the status of a major task force commander with the major CIA functions being performed by the task force under his command. It is the concept that while CIA functions in the area would be organized on the task principle, the task force commander and his force would only pass under the command of [redacted] in the event of war or when so directed by higher CIA authority. The proposal offers the advantage of facilitating transition from peace to war and of placing the CIA director in the area in the position of a major commander subordinate only to the CinC himself.

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c. A tendency to expect military tactical type intelligence from CIA was noted in questions posed by several members of the staff [redacted]

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c. Our personnel while enthusiastic and eager do not seem to be too well grounded in area knowledge or to have the "feel of the country". Senior Armed Services intelligence personnel were prone to be critical of our local planning and execution of operations as being immature and not too well conceived.

d. I noted very little local coordination of intelligence gathering efforts. For instance, at the same time that

many of our

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many of our Armed Services attaches and our own clandestine sources were consistently reporting

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f. There is widespread lack of knowledge among important Armed Services officers of the capabilities and, more importantly, the limitations of CIA intelligence procurement. This leads almost inexorably to blaming CIA for every intelligence lack without too much critical examination of their own shortcomings.

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ROUTING SLIP

FROM: THE DIRECTOR

DATE
MAR 21 1952

TO:

Mr. Dulles
Mr. Wisner
Mr. Wolf
Mr. Becker
Mr. Hedden

Col. Hansen
Secretary

FOR:

Action
Information
Draft reply for my signature
Direct reply
Recommendation
See me

Remarks:

*Noted - When you
have the preliminary
plans roughed
out, talk with
me about them*

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MEMORANDUM TO: T. DIRECTOR

The attached memorandum to yourself, which I dictated last night and which contains certain comments on my part about our Far Eastern operations, has been to some extent overtaken by our conversation of this morning. Nevertheless, I should still appreciate your reading this.

In our conversation of this morning, I cleared with you the matter of my furnishing copies of my memorandum to [] and Kirkpatrick, who I find have already had access to copies of the [] Report.

Noted by DCI

21 March 1952

Frank G. Wisner

14 March 1952
(DATE)

FORM NO. 10-101 OCT 1950

(47)

MEMORANDUM TO: MR. BULLES

Last night you asked for the original
of report on CIA instal-
lations in the Far East. It is attached
hereto.


Walter C. [Signature]



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26 March 1952
(DATE)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	 DD/P E.R.		
2			23 June
3			
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	E87DD/P		
2			
3			

- ☐ APPROVAL
☐ ACTION
☐ COMMENT
☐ CONCURRENCE

- ☐ INFORMATION
☐ DIRECT REPLY
☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY
☐ RECOMMENDATION

- ☐ SIGNATURE
☐ RETURN
☐ DISPATCH
☐ FILE

REMARKS:

Pls. return to DD/P
3 for file